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Tracking the Care of Patients with Severe Chronic Illness
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More than 90 million Americans live with at least one chronic 
illness, and seven out of ten Americans die from chronic disease. 
The quality of care for Americans with chronic disease is remarkably 
uneven.1 Most patients receive episodic care from multiple different 
physicians who rarely coordinate the care they deliver. And the grow-
ing costs of chronic disease care present a threat not only to patients 
and their families but also to the nation.2
For patients with chronic illnesses, geography matters. Depending 
upon where they live, and which hospital or health care organization 
they are loyal to, patients with chronic illnesses receive very different 
care: the frequency of primary care visits per Medicare enrollee varies 
by a factor of almost three; visits to medical specialists by more than 
five; and hospitalizations for congestive heart failure and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease by more than four. Spending on patients 
with serious chronic illness varies by a factor of nearly three.3
Most Americans would assume that these variations are due primarily 
to differences in how sick people are. And most would assume 
that those living in the regions getting more care would be getting 
better care and achieving better health outcomes. But neither of 
these assumptions holds true. Analyses of variations in practice and 
spending thus provide insights into the underlying causes of poor 
quality and rising costs and point to important opportunities to reform 
the U.S. health care system.
This edition of The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care describes how 
care for Medicare beneficiaries with serious chronic illness varies 
across U.S. states, regions, and hospitals. As in the 2006 edition, the 
focus is on Medicare beneficiaries who have serious chronic illness 
and are in their last two years of life. This edition both updates the 
earlier analyses to encompass more recent data (now through 2005) 
and expands the scope to include all sectors of care covered by the 
Medicare program, including acute inpatient hospital care, outpatient 
services, skilled nursing and long-term hospital care, home health 
care and hospice services. This Executive Summary provides a brief 
overview of the major findings, conclusions, insights, and recommen-
dations that are presented in the current edition.
Lead Author John E. Wennberg   Co-Authors Elliott S. Fisher, David C. Goodman, Jonathan S. Skinner
“ In health care, 
it matters 
where you get 
your care.”
To access the full version  
of this report, please visit  
www.dartmouthatlas.org
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Some variations in practice are clearly justified. Unwarranted variations refer to 
variations in practice or spending that cannot be explained on the basis of illness, 
strong scientific evidence, or well-informed patient preferences.4 The Dartmouth 
Atlas Project distinguishes three categories of care (see box).
The focus of this Atlas is on the use of just one category, supply-sensitive care, 
among Medicare patients with severe chronic illness who are in their last two 
years of life. One reason for this focus is because of the growing concern about 
the way chronic illness is managed in the United States, and about the increasing 
recognition that some chronically ill and dying Americans are receiving too much 
care—more than they and their families actually want or benefit from.
Our emphasis on this period of life is also motivated by our interest in developing 
measures of health system performance that minimize the chance that variation in 
the care delivered in different regions and by different hospitals can be explained by 
differences in the severity of patients’ illnesses. By looking at care delivered during 
fixed intervals of time prior to death, we can say with assurance that the prognosis 
of all the patients is identical: all were dead after the interval of observation. By 
further adjusting for differences in age, sex, race, and primary chronic diagnosis, 
we believe that we have developed fair measures of the relative intensity of care 
provided to equally ill patients—comparisons for which differences among patients 
are an unlikely explanation.
Unwarranted Variation 
and the 
Categories of Care
Effective care consists of evidence-based interventions where the benefits 
so substantially exceed the harms that eligible patients should receive the 
care. The provision of life-saving drugs following a heart attack is an example. 
Variation in the use of such treatments among eligible patients reflects a failure 
to deliver needed care—or underuse.
Preference-sensitive care encompasses treatment decisions where 
different choices carry quite different benefits and risks and where patients’ 
attitudes toward these outcomes vary. An example would be the use of bypass 
surgery for heart disease, where surgery is likely to improve patients’ chest 
pain but carries a small but real risk of causing memory loss. Unwarranted 
variations in preference-sensitive care reflect both the limitations of current 
scientific evidence and the failure to ensure that patients are making fully 
informed choices.
Supply-sensitive care refers to services where the supply of a specific 
resource (e.g., the number of specialists per capita) has a major influence 
on utilization rates. Physician visits, hospitalizations, stays in intensive care 
units, and imaging services are all examples of care where the local supply 
influences the frequency of use. Variations in supply-sensitive care are largely 
due to differences in local capacity and a payment system that ensures current 
capacity remains fully deployed.
Categories of  
Clinical Services
Executive Summary
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Chapter One summarizes the now extensive research on the underlying causes of 
variations in practice and spending across regions and hospitals for patients with 
chronic illness and the implications of these variations for the quality and outcomes 
of care.
Variations in spending are not due to differences in the prevalence 
of serious illness. Although there are differences in the prevalence of severe 
chronic illness across U.S. regions, these differences explain only a small 
proportion—about 4%—of the variations in Medicare spending across the 306 
hospital referral regions (HRRs) defined by the Dartmouth Atlas Project.
Variations in spending are largely due to differences in supply-
sensitive care. Extensive research, dating back to early work by Milton Roemer, 
has confirmed the strong association between per capita supply of hospital beds 
and hospitalization rates for common medical conditions. For conditions where 
hospitalization is required—as with hip fractures—variations in utilization are 
unrelated to the local supply of beds. But where medical decisions are more 
discretionary—as is the case for patients with heart failure and most other medical 
conditions—admission rates are strongly correlated with the local supply of hospital 
beds. And in regions with more physicians, the frequency of visits to physicians is 
higher. The degree of variation is remarkable: during the five-year period 2001–05, 
on average, patients with chronic illnesses living in the region using the least 
supply-sensitive care spent about 6.1 days in hospitals during their last six months 
of life, while those living in the region using the most supply-sensitive services 
spent an average of 21.9 days as inpatients during the last six months of their lives. 
How often chronically ill patients saw a physician during their last six months of life 
also varied substantially. In the region that used the most supply-sensitive care, 
terminal patients had an average of almost 60 visits during their last six months; in 
the lowest ranked regions, the average was about 15 visits.
Is more better? Over the past ten years, a growing body of research has asked 
whether greater use of supply-sensitive care results in better quality of care or bet-
ter health outcomes. And the answer is increasingly clear. Whether from patients’ 
perspective (satisfaction, technical quality, health outcomes) or from physicians’ 
perspective (quality of communication among physicians, continuity of care), higher 
spending and greater use of supply-sensitive care is not associated with better 
care. The same findings hold true whether one looks at all Medicare beneficiaries 
and the comparisons are made across regions of differing spending levels (Table 1) 
or whether one looks only at patients with serious illnesses cared for at the major 
academic medical centers within the United States.5
Chronic Illness  
and the Problem of  
Supply-Sensitive Care  
(Chapter One)
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What is going on? The likely explanation for both the dramatic differences in 
spending and the strong correlations with supply lies in the lack of firm scientific 
evidence available to guide most clinical decisions; the general assumption among 
both physicians and patients that more medical care means better care; the marked 
variations in supply that emerge in an unplanned marketplace; and a fee-for-service 
payment system that rewards providers for staying busy. Physicians adapt their 
practice subliminally to the available resources. From the primary care physician’s 
perspective, for example, it will often seem more efficient to refer to a specialist or 
admit to the hospital if those resources are available and payments for office-based 
primary care have been constrained. The key element of the theory is that because 
so many clinical decisions are in the “gray areas” of medicine where evidence is 
now lacking (how often to see a patient, when to refer to a specialist, when to 
admit), any expansion of capacity will result in subtle shifts of clinical judgment 
toward greater intensity of care.
Implications for patient preferences. Concern about overly aggressive 
care for patients at the end of life has sparked increasing interest both in palliative 
care and in aligning the kinds of services provided to dying patients with their well-
informed preferences. Because care for seriously ill patients varies so substantially 
across regions and hospitals, patients and their families can benefit from the insights 
about their own systems provided in this edition of the Atlas. In some communities, 
they may be able to choose hospitals or other sites where the intensity of care is 
most in keeping with their personal preferences, especially at the end of life.
Implications for evaluating efficiency in managing chronic illness. 
The dramatic differences in costs and the absence of any evidence of benefit from 
higher spending points to important opportunities and challenges for U.S.  policy 
makers. The opportunity lies in the potential gains in efficiency that could be 
Higher spending regions compared to lower spending*
Health care resources6
n Per capita supply of hospital beds 32% higher.
n Per capita supply of physicians 31% higher overall: 65% more medical specialists, 75% more general internists, 29% more surgeons, and 
26% fewer family practitioners.
Content and quality of care4,6,7
n adherence to process-based measures of quality lower (quality worse). 
n little difference in rates of major elective surgery.
n more hospital stays, physician visits, specialist referrals, imaging, and minor tests and procedures.
Health outcomes8,9
n mortality over a period of up to five years slightly higher following acute myocardial infarction, hip fracture, and colorectal cancer diagnosis.
n no difference in functional status.
Physician perceptions of quality10
n more likely to report poor communication among physicians.
n more likely to report inadequate continuity of patient care.
n greater difficulty obtaining inpatient admissions or high quality specialist referrals.
Patient-reported quality of care8
n worse access to care and greater waiting times.
n no difference in patient-reported satisfaction with care.
Trends over time9
n although all u.S. regions experienced improvements in acute myocardial infarction survival between 1986 and 2002, regions with greater 
growth in spending had smaller gains in survival than those with lower growth in spending. 
* High and low spending regions were defined as the U.S. hospital referral regions in the highest and lowest quintiles of per capita Medicare spending as in Fisher, 2003.6
Table 1. Regional Differences in Spending and the Content, Quality, and Outcomes of Care
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1.20 to 1.28   (3)
1.00 to < 1.20  (11)
0.85 to < 1.00  (23)
0.70 to < 0.85  (14)
Ratio of state to the U.S. average of total
Medicare spending per chronically ill
decedent during the last two years of life
by State (deaths occurring 2001-05)
achieved if higher spending regions or hospitals adopted the practice patterns of 
the most efficient U.S. regions. For example, if all U.S. regions could safely adopt 
the practice patterns observed for the most efficient regions (such as Madison, 
Wisconsin; Sioux Falls, South Dakota; or Des Moines, Iowa), spending during 2005 
for patients with severe chronic illness would have declined by over 25%.
This edition of the Atlas presents measures of spending and utilization at both the 
state and regional levels, and for the first time includes data on all sectors of care 
that are reimbursed through the Medicare program, including acute care hospitals; 
doctors’ offices and outpatient clinics; skilled nursing facilities; long-term care hos-
pitals and rehabilitation facilities; hospices; and care delivered at patients’ homes 
by home health agencies.
Two important insights emerge from these data. First, the volume of services pro-
vided is a more important determinant of spending than is the price paid for each 
service. Second, the availability of lower cost sectors does not appear to reduce the 
utilization in higher cost sectors. In other words, there is no evidence of substitution 
of services across sectors.
Variation in Medicare spending among the states and regions: As 
was well documented in previous Atlases, the amount of money the Medicare 
Variation in  
Medicare Spending  
Among States and Regions 
(Chapter Two)
Map 1. Total Medicare Spending 
During the Last Two Years of Life 
for Patients with At Least One of 
Nine Chronic Conditions, by State 
(Deaths Occurring 2001–05)
program spends per patient with severe 
chronic illness in the last two years of life 
varies substantially among states. During 
the period 2001–05, thirteen states had 
spending levels above the national aver-
age; 37 states had spending levels below 
the national average, and in fourteen of 
these, spending was less than 85% of the 
national average. The highest spending 
states consumed more than one and a half 
times the Medicare dollars spent by the 
lowest spending states. Three states—New 
Jersey, California, and New York—spent 
at a level that was more than 20% above 
the national average of $46,412. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, three states 
—North Dakota, Iowa, and South Dakota—
spent less than $35,000 per person, more 
than 25% below the national average.
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There was even greater variation in spending among the 306 hospital referral 
regions. Spending in the three highest HRRs—Manhattan, the Bronx, and Los 
Angeles—exceeded spending in the three lowest—Mason City, Iowa; La Crosse, 
Wisconsin; and Dubuque, Iowa—by almost $46,000 per patient. And the degree of 
variation among HRRs located within a single state, New York, was nearly as great 
as that found among all hospital referral regions: more than $75,000 per chroni-
cally ill decedent in the Bronx and Manhattan hospital referral regions compared to 
$36,824 in Rochester and $33,271 in Binghamton.
The majority of spending occurs in the acute care hospital  setting. 
Almost 55% of the total amount spent on Medicare beneficiaries during their last 
two years of life was in the acute care hospital setting. This includes not only hos-
pital inpatient facility charges, but also payments for inpatient physician visits, 
procedures, and diagnostic tests. Spending in outpatient settings comprised the 
next largest fraction of spending—15.6%—whereas other sectors received smaller 
shares of payments.
The volume of services provided is a major determinant of  differences 
in spending. Medicare and other payers have focused much of their attention on 
controlling the prices paid to providers for clinical services. Analyses presented in 
the current Atlas show that differences in the volume of services are more strongly 
related to state and regional differences in spending than price. State-level variations 
in inpatient hospital spending, for example, are more strongly correlated with the 
volume of services (measured as the number of hospital days per beneficiary, R2 = 
0.59) than was price (reimbursements per day, R2 = 0.07). Similar patterns are seen 
for other services. Addressing variation in spending will require attention not only to 
price, but also to volume. 
Tradeoffs among sectors of care: no evidence of substitution. Many 
believe that expanding access to non-acute care sectors, such as skilled nursing or 
rehabilitation facilities, home health services, or hospices, will reduce the utilization 
of expensive acute care hospital services. The data in this Dartmouth Atlas sug-
gest that making other kinds of care more readily available does not necessarily 
lead to a decline in either hospitalizations or inpatient spending. In fact, at both 
the state and regional levels, higher utilization and spending in ambulatory set-
tings, skilled nursing facilities, and home health care was associated with higher 
utilization and spending for inpatient care. Hospice care was the only setting that 
showed a weak inverse association with inpatient days in hospital and inpatient 
spending. The association between higher spending and utilization of ambulatory 
care, particularly physician visits, with greater numbers of inpatient visits was 
particularly strong.
Likely explanation: a system that rewards volume and reinforces 
fragmentation. What can account for the paradoxical finding that higher inpa-
tient care utilization is associated with greater ambulatory and skilled nursing care? 
First, traditional Medicare pays for utilization in each sector without regard to the 
level of spending in the others. Second, as we have argued above, both the cur-
rent fee-for-service payment system and the culture of medicine itself ensures that 
available capacity is utilized. When patients experience acute episodes of their 
ThE DarTmouTh aTlaS of hEalTh carE   www.DarTmouThaTlaS.org 7 
underlying chronic illnesses, most physicians continue to believe that more inten-
sive rescue care is better; the availability of inpatient beds makes the use of the 
hospital the path of least resistance, even when other sites of care are in place. 
Third, the positive association between the use of inpatient facilities and use of 
skilled nursing facilities and home health agencies makes clinical sense; these 
facilities are important in planning for the discharge of chronically ill patients from 
acute care hospitals. When more patients are hospitalized, more are discharged to 
other care sectors, creating “demand” for such services.
The tendency to admit patients to the hospital even when alternatives are available 
is further exacerbated by the fragmented nature of much of the care that is deliv-
ered to chronically ill elderly patients. There is little coordination between primary 
care physicians and the many specialists that the chronically ill often find them-
selves seeing; nor is there coordination of care between the various alternative 
sites where care can be delivered. In the ambulatory setting, for instance, patients 
with chronic heart failure are routinely hospitalized during acute episodes of the 
underlying disease that often could have been controlled with better disease man-
agement and coordination between physicians.
Implications: training more primary care physicians alone won’t 
solve the problem. Some have argued that the fragmentation of care is due to 
a shortage of primary care physicians, who should be coordinating care between a 
patient’s various doctors and the different sectors of care. But simply increasing the 
number of primary care physicians alone will not address the lack of coordination. 
Spending on ambulatory visits, many of them to primary care physicians, is posi-
tively correlated with inpatient days and inpatient physician visits, in part because 
the payment system fails to reward office-based physicians for managing disease 
and coordinating care. The findings in this chapter underscore the need for care 
coordination, reform of the payment system, and focus on capacity.
Academic medical centers are responsible not only for the education of current 
and future physicians, but also for establishing the scientific basis of medical care. 
This edition of the Atlas examines variations among America’s top academic medi-
cal centers (AMCs), focusing on three measures: Medicare spending, resource 
availability, and utilization. Data are provided for the primary teaching hospitals 
associated with all U.S. medical schools, but special attention is focused on the five 
AMCs that U.S.News & World Report placed at the top of its 2007 Honor Roll for 
America’s Best Hospitals.
How America’s Best 
Hospitals Manage Chronic 
Illness (Chapter Three)
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The remarkable differences among these hospitals highlight both the challenges 
and the opportunities that emerge from a critical evaluation of their practices. 
Spending: Medicare spent more than $93,000 per patient for those loyal to 
UCLA over the last two years of life. By contrast, for those who received most 
of their care at the Mayo Clinic, spending came to a little more than half that 
amount.
Utilization: Chronically ill patients loyal to UCLA had more than twice as 
many physician visits compared to Mayo, and they spent about 50% more 
days in the hospital.
Resource Use: Compared to the Mayo Clinic, UCLA used about one and 
a half times the number of beds and almost twice as many physician FTEs in 
managing similar patients
Benchmarks of efficiency. The current edition of the Atlas draws on these data 
to propose an approach to measuring and improving the efficiency of U.S. hospitals’ 
chronic disease care using the principles of benchmarking and the concept of relative 
efficiency. The Mayo Clinic and the Cleveland Clinic, for instance, allocate relatively 
Table 2. Spending, Resource Use, and Utilization of Services Among Medicare Beneficiaries with Chronic Illness Cared For at 
Five “Honor Roll” Academic Medical Centers (Deaths Occurring 2001–05)
UCLA Medical 
Center
Johns Hopkins 
Hospital
Massachusetts 
General Hospital
Cleveland Clinic 
Foundation
Mayo Clinic (St. 
Mary’s Hospital)
Medicare spending per patient during last two years of life
Total medicare spending $93,842 $85,729 $78,666 $55,333 $53,432
inpatient site of care $63,900 $63,079 $43,058 $34,437 $34,372
outpatient site of care $14,125 $13,404 $11,509 $8,906 $7,557
Skilled nursing/long-term care facility $6,891 $3,287 $15,149 $5,101 $7,114
other sectors of care $8,926 $5,959 $8,951 $6,889 $4,389
Resource inputs per 1,000 patients during last two years of life
hospital beds 85.8 78.2 79.2 65.5 58.2
intensive care (icu) beds 38.1 20.0 16.0 19.2 18.4
fTE physician labor
All physicians 38.5 25.7 29.5 26.1 20.3
Primary care physicians 9.6 10.0 11.5 8.8 6.8
Medical specialists 21.2 8.9 11.7 10.6 8.9
Care during last six months of life
hospital days per patient 18.5 16.5 17.3 14.8 12.0
Physician visits per patient 52.8 28.9 39.5 33.1 23.9
Terminal care
Percent of deaths associated with icu admission 37.9 23.2 22.5 23.1 21.8
Percent admitted to hospice 28.8 35.2 23.8 36.6 29.1
Average estimated co-payments per patient for physician services 
and durable medical equipment during the last two years of life
$4,835 $3,390 $3,409 $3,045 $2,439
ThE DarTmouTh aTlaS of hEalTh carE   www.DarTmouThaTlaS.org 9 
fewer resources per capita and spend less per capita than their peers, while simul-
taneously receiving high marks on established quality measures. Other academic 
medical centers use far more resources, deliver far more supply-sensitive care, and 
cost significantly more per capita, but with no better quality. We propose employing 
the spending, resource input, and utilization profiles of the relatively efficient aca-
demic medical centers as benchmarks for gauging the performance of the rest.
The current Atlas provides numerous examples of how this approach to bench-
marking may be used to compare efficiency, estimate labor inputs, and calculate 
the potential savings that could be achieved by reducing overuse of  supply-sensitive 
services at high-cost institutions. An example based upon data from UCLA and the 
Mayo Clinic is provided in the box.
Estimating potential savings. Data from the Atlas can therefore be used to 
estimate the savings that could be achieved if, for example, UCLA met the utiliza-
tion benchmark provided by the Mayo Clinic. Because reimbursement rates reflect 
local and federal factors that are beyond the control of hospital administrators 
(such as local labor costs and variable subsidies for graduate medical educa-
tion), the volume standard of St. Mary’s (21.3 days per decedent) can be applied 
to the UCLA reimbursement rate per day ($1,871) to estimate what per decedent 
spending would have been had the Mayo utilization benchmark applied ($39,772 
per decedent). The savings in hospital reimbursements from meeting the utiliza-
tion benchmark provided by Mayo would thus be $18,785 per patient. A similar 
approach can be used to estimate savings for physician evaluation and manage-
ment services ($2,974 per decedent loyal to UCLA). This results in an estimate of 
almost $22,000 in potential savings per decedent, a 34% reduction in payments for 
these two sectors of care alone.
Understanding the Role of Volume and Price: The Medical Care Cost Equation
As was discussed above, both volume and price contribute to the differences in spending that are observed across states and 
regions. The same is true for the chronic disease populations cared for by individual hospitals. To understand the relative contribution 
of each and to estimate potential savings from reducing the volume of services, it is useful to consider “the medical care cost 
equation,” which makes these contributions transparent. The equation can be expressed in terms of actual dollars, as well as ratios 
to a benchmark. Table 3, below, illustrates both, using the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, MN as the benchmark.
Table 3. The Medical Care Cost Equation
The relative contributions of volume and price to the differences in inpatient spending are clearly shown in the table. UCLA’s inpatient 
spending was 1.84 times that of the Mayo Clinic because its patients spent 47% more days in the hospital and reimbursements per 
day were 25% higher. Using the Cleveland Clinic as the benchmark would show that spending at UCLA was 87% higher, because 
UCLA patients spent 31% more days in the hospital, and reimbursements per day were 43% higher.
Academic Medical Center Inpatient 
reimbursements 
per decedent
Hospital days 
per decedent
Reimbursements  
per day
Ratio to Mayo Clinic
inpatient 
reimb.
= hospital 
days
x reimb. per 
day
Johns Hopkins Hospital $59,759 28.6 $2,093 1.88 = 1.34 x 1.40
UCLA Medical Center $58,557 31.3 $1,871 1.84 = 1.47 x 1.25
Massachusetts General Hospital $38,844 28.9 $1,344 1.22 = 1.36 x 0.90
Mayo Clinic (St. Mary’s Hospital) $31,816 21.3 $1,497 1.00 = 1.00 x 1.00
Cleveland Clinic Foundation $31,252 23.9 $1,307 0.98 = 1.13 x 0.87
Academic Medical Center Nurse requirements according to level of bed intensity
Total High-intensity ICU/CCU beds Intermediate-intensity ICU beds Medical & surgical unit beds
UCLA Medical Center 80.7 20.7 24.3 35.8
Massachusetts General Hospital 70.9 22.6 1.0 47.4
Johns Hopkins Hospital 69.6 17.7 8.2 43.7
Cleveland Clinic Foundation 61.1 21.5 4.8 34.8
Mayo Clinic (St. Mary’s Hospital) 56.5 24.6 2.0 29.9
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Rethinking the physician shortage. The varying patterns of use of physi-
cian labor at different academic medical centers demonstrate the lack of consensus 
on how many physicians to use and the preferred mix between specialists and 
primary care physicians. If there is no consensus on how to use the current supply 
of physicians, how can academic medicine provide meaningful estimates of how 
many the nation now needs, much less what will be needed in the future? The 
debate over the projected need for physicians cannot be resolved without under-
standing the effect that the physician workforce supply has on utilization patterns. 
In light of the evidence that regions and academic medical centers with greater use 
of physician labor in managing chronic illness incur higher costs and have slightly 
worse outcomes (Table 1), the assertion that the nation faces a physician shortage 
warrants critical examination.11
Rethinking the nursing shortage. Finally, the variation among academic 
medical centers in the number of hospital beds used in managing their patient 
populations implies variation in the number of registered nurses required to treat 
patients in the hospital. The method is described in detail in Chapter Three. The 
variation in staffing requirements for the top five academic medical centers is shown 
in Table 4.
Table 4. Inpatient Nurse Staffing Requirements per 1,000 Decedents to Meet Proposed Federal Standards of Care During the 
Last Two Years of Life among Medicare Beneficiaries with Chronic Illness Cared For at Five “Honor Roll” Academic Medical 
Centers (Deaths Occurring 2001-05)
These data suggest that reducing the overuse of acute care hospitals would not 
only save money, it could also help resolve the national shortage in the registered 
nurse workforce.
The hospital capacity effect on chronic disease care: a medical sig-
nature. The data presented in the Atlas demonstrate how dramatically academic 
medical centers vary in the per capita number of physicians, beds, and nurses 
they use relative to the size of the patient populations they serve. In the case of 
supply-sensitive care, the effect is revealed in a hospital’s “medical signature,” a 
characteristic pattern of practice that persists over time and is consistent across 
different diseases. Hospitals with low utilization rates for patients with one chronic 
condition tend to have low utilization rates for patients with other conditions, and 
vice versa.  Figure 1 provides just one example: the relationship between hospital 
day rates for patients with cancer and with congestive heart failure (CHF). Similar 
correlations are observed when one looks at patients with other chronic illnesses, 
when one studies patients from different socioeconomic backgrounds, or when one 
compares older and younger, male and female, and black and non-black patients.
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Finally, this hospital effect, or medical signature, is highly consistent over time (in 
the absence of major changes in hospital capacity). Figure 2 shows the close rela-
tionship between hospital day rates during the last six months of life and during 
the 19–24 months prior to death. That patients grew increasingly ill over time is 
reflected in the fact that per capita hospital days were roughly three to four times 
greater during the last six months of life as compared with months 19-24 preceding 
death. But the variation in rates among hospitals was striking during both periods, 
and the amount of care given to patients early in the two year period preceding 
death was highly correlated with care intensity during the last six months of life for 
each individual hospital. A similar association exists for physician visit rates. In light 
of these associations, the intensity of care during the last six months of life can be 
viewed as a valid illness-adjusted indicator of a specific provider’s practice style for 
managing chronic illness overall, not just a measure of “end-of-life” care during the 
terminal phase of illness.
Care intensity and patient choice. Many Americans are concerned about 
the care they will likely receive at the end of life and express their wishes for the 
care they would prefer through advance directives. Yet the differences across hos-
pitals (and substantial research) suggests that the patient’s wishes may have less 
influence on the intensity of care he or she receives than the practice patterns at 
the hospital where care is delivered.12,13 
Figure 1. Association Between Hospital Day Rates per 
Decedent for Patients with Cancer and Congestive 
Heart Failure During the Last Six Months of Life 
Among Patients Receiving Most of their Care at 
Selected Academic Medical Centers (Deaths Occurring 
2001–05)
Figure 2. The Relationship Between Hospital Day 
Rates During the Six Months and 19–24 Months 
prior to Death Among Patients with At Least One 
of Nine Chronic Conditions Receiving Most of their 
Care at Selected Academic Medical Centers (Deaths 
Occurring 2001–05)
CH
F 
pa
tie
nt
s’ 
ho
sp
ita
l d
ay
 ra
te
s 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
la
st
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s 
of
 li
fe
Cancer patients’ hospital day rates 
during the last six months of life
Hospital days per decedent during the 
19–24 months prior to death
H
os
pi
ta
l d
ay
s 
pe
r d
ec
ed
en
t d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
la
st
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s 
of
 li
fe
12 ExEcuTivE Summary: Tracking ThE carE of PaTiEnTS wiTh SEvErE chronic illnESS
Executive Summary
Hospital-specific data that make end-of-life practice patterns transparent could 
help patients and families identify providers whose care patterns correspond 
more closely to their preferences. For those who seek more conservative, less 
aggressive care, the Dartmouth Atlas can point to those hospitals and associated 
physicians whose practice patterns match this preference. For those who want as 
much care as possible, the data show which providers appear to meet this need. 
We discuss these ideas further below.
This edition of the Dartmouth Atlas provides several case studies of how hospital-
specific performance measures can be used to support local reform initiatives and 
improve patient choice. Using the spending, resource input, and utilization profiles 
of relatively efficient providers to evaluate hospital efficiency provides a means to 
rank hospitals and gives less efficient providers potential models for how to allo-
cate resources more rationally.
A high-cost region. Los Angeles, a hospital referral region that epitomizes high-
cost, high-intensity health care, provides an important and telling example. The 
region as a whole ranked third among the 306 Atlas HRRs in Medicare spending, 
second in intensive care bed use per 1,000 in the chronically ill Medicare popula-
tion, and second in per capita physician labor inputs during the last two years of 
life for patients dying during the five-year period 2001–05. Care intensity during 
the last six months of life was also very high. Los Angeles patients were near the 
top in the national distribution in “high-tech” deaths: 30.2% of deaths were associ-
ated with intensive care, third highest in the nation. Because of its high-intensity 
pattern of care, Los Angeles also ranked near the top (third out of 306 regions) in 
the amount of co-payments for which patients were responsible.
Variation among providers within Los Angeles. The health care pro-
viders serving any given region are not all alike, including the providers in Los 
Angeles (Figure 3). Medicare spending during the last two years of life varied from 
$131,000 per beneficiary at the most costly Los Angeles hospital to $61,000 at the 
least expensive hospital. The current edition provides data to support benchmark-
ing against integrated delivery systems, such as the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, 
Minnesota, Intermountain Healthcare (IHC) in Utah, and the Sutter system hospi-
tals in Sacramento. While the Mayo Clinic originated as a physician group practice 
in Rochester, Minnesota, both Sutter and Intermountain Healthcare evolved from 
the consolidation of several hospitals into integrated systems where the organi-
zation of the physician staff into group practices remains an ongoing process. 
Regardless of which benchmark is chosen, however, the data point to a substan-
tial—and variable—degree of overuse of supply-sensitive services at Los Angeles 
hospitals. These differences in spending, as has been discussed before, reflect 
real differences in utilization and resource inputs, with a relatively small contribu-
tion due to price differences.
Evaluating Local Health 
Systems: The Case of 
Los Angeles (Chapter Four)
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Opportunities for savings. If one uses the average per decedent resource 
inputs of Sutter, the Mayo Clinic, and IHC as a composite benchmark for efficiency 
in managing severe chronic illness, Los Angeles hospitals used 81% more hospital 
beds than needed; 106% more ICU beds; 110% more FTE physicians; and would 
have required 75% more registered nurses under proposed federal standards. That 
amounts to a lot of wasted effort and unnecessary care.
Hospitals are nonetheless expanding acute care capacity. The excess 
resources available in Los Angeles seem to have no influence on capitalization deci-
sions by administrators to add yet more beds and additional resources to the region’s 
hospitals. During our evaluation of the management of chronic illness in Los Angeles, 
we learned that many of the region’s hospitals are busy building new facilities, moti-
vated in large part by the need to update existing structures to meet new earthquake 
building codes. Instead of expanding, Los Angeles hospitals could strive to improve 
efficiency by reducing capacity.
Figure 3. Medicare Spending per Decedent During the Last 
Two Years of Life for Patients with At Least One of Nine 
Chronic Conditions Among Los Angeles Hospitals and 
Selected Benchmark Systems (Deaths Occurring 2001–05)
Rate Ratio to 
IHC
Highest $130,992 2.82
2nd highest $120,756 2.60
75th percentile $93,862 2.02
L.A. hospitals average $84,317 1.82
25th percentile $74,120 1.60
2nd lowest $63,661 1.37
Lowest $61,239 1.32
Sutter (Sacramento) $50,718 1.09
Mayo (Rochester) $50,273 1.08
IHC (SLC/Ogden) $46,377 1.00
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of Long Beach
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Medical  
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Pacific  
Hospital of  
Long Beach
Long Beach 
Memorial 
Medical Center
Ratio  
high to 
low
Medicare spending in last two years of life
Total medicare spending per decedent $98,315 $89,937 $80,710 1.22
Resource use during last two years of life
hospital beds 118.1 84.7 78.3 1.51
fTE physician labor 47.8 32.3 40.8 1.48
Care intensity during last six months of life
Physician visits 82.1 58.0 61.0 1.42
hospital days 23.1 18.5 15.9 1.45
% of deaths with icu admission 30.5 30.6 33.2 1.09
% admitted to hospice 20.9 18.8 26.0 1.38
Estimated co-payments per decedent (last two years) $6,099 $3,996 $4,735 1.53
hospital compare composite quality score* 85.5 n/a 85.9 1.01
Map 2. Long Beach 
A practical example: What might happen in Long Beach? The current 
edition of the Atlas works through examples of how hospitals in Los Angeles that 
are within a single hospital system in Los Angeles (Catholic Healthcare West), or 
within the same neighborhood (Long Beach) can be compared. The Long Beach 
community is served by three acute care hospitals located within three miles of 
each other (Map 2). Averaged over the five-year period from 2001–05, patients 
loyal to St. Mary Medical Center cost the Medicare program more than $98,000 per 
patient, 9% more than Pacific Hospital of Long Beach ($90,000 per patient) and 
22% more than Long Beach Memorial Hospital ($81,000).
These differences highlight both the opportunities and the challenges facing 
both Los Angeles and the country.
Table 5. Medicare Spending, Resource Inputs, and Care Intensity Among Hospitals in 
Long Beach (Deaths Occurring 2001–05)
*all enrollees, 2005
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How could hospitals improve their efficiency? Expand their popu-
lation base. From the point of view of a Los Angeles hospital, the preferred 
route to improving efficiency would be to expand its market share of chronically 
ill patients—to increase its “population base” while keeping capacity constant. For 
example, Long Beach Memorial Hospital could increase its population of severely 
ill Medicare patients by 39% before it would reach the Mayo Clinic benchmark for 
the number of beds required to care for its population. If Long Beach could achieve 
this population growth (and did not increase its bed, ICU, physician, or other such 
critical resource capacity that drives supply-sensitive care), then overall per capita 
Medicare spending and utilization should show a comparable 39% drop.
Where would the patients come from? Why might they shift their 
 loyalty? Patients with severe chronic illness are not highly mobile, so the most 
likely source would be patients who already are living in the Long Beach area: those 
who now use Catholic Healthcare West’s St. Mary Medical Center, for instance. As 
we have seen, Medicare spending for inpatient and physician services over the last 
two years of life is about $17,600 per person more for patients who use St. Mary than 
Long Beach Memorial. Thus, $17,600 is the expected reduction in cost for caring for 
an “average” chronically patient with two years of life expectancy who transfers to 
Long Beach Memorial from St. Mary. As more patients move from St. Mary to Long 
Beach Memorial, the costs of managing chronic illness at Long Beach Memorial 
on a per person basis would decrease even further: if the Mayo Clinic benchmark 
were reached at Long Beach Memorial, the estimated per decedent spending for 
inpatient and physician spending would drop from $80,710 to $57,912.
Who wins and why? One group of winners in this scenario would be payers—
insurance companies, Medicare Advantage plans, and Long Beach employers with 
large numbers of older workers and retirees, such as Boeing. They would all see 
their costs fall. The Long Beach Memorial Hospital could also become a winner 
if it were willing and able to take risks, based on the knowledge that its costs are 
below average, and actively seek contracts with Medicare Advantage plans and 
area employers to offer it a better deal than its competitors in managing chronic 
illness over time. Perhaps the greatest benefit would accrue to the Medicare enroll-
ees who, by virtue of their change in hospital, would experience improved quality 
of carei and would be exposed to less physical and financial risk from acute care 
hospitalization and high-intensity care at the end of life.
But the situation is not “win-win”. The same logic and the same empirical 
evidence that predicts a decrease in per patient volume of care for Long Beach 
Memorial predicts an increase for patients remaining loyal to St. Mary. Unless, by 
some unforeseen mechanism, capacity at St. Mary was reduced in proportion to its 
decreasing population, per capita care intensity and Medicare spending for its loyal 
patient population would go up. St. Mary patients would experience more physician 
visits, hospitalizations, and stays in intensive care, and incur greater out-of-pocket 
costs for co-payments because the medical resources available per patient in the 
population would increase. And Medicare, because it currently pays for utiliza-
tion, not efficient management of the chronically ill over time, would experience no 
i
  According to CMS measures, the quality of care for Long Beach Memorial already ranks higher than 
for St. Mary. 
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decline in overall costs. Any savings through increased efficiency at Long Beach 
Memorial would likely be lost in paying for increased utilization at St. Mary. 
The problem: supply-sensitive care and Roemer’s law in action. 
Because reduction in capacity means reduction in utilization, and reduction in utiliza-
tion means lowered revenue, reducing capacity leads to lower revenue. As patients 
move to more efficient hospitals like Long Beach Memorial, less efficient hospitals 
like St. Mary would lose not just the cash flow to pay for current capacity; many would 
also find it difficult to pay off their debt to the bond market. Failure to meet these 
obligations could mean bankruptcy. Managers of for-profit hospitals are accountable 
to investors. It is hard for hospitals to reduce excess capacity, no matter how such 
measures might improve the quality of the care they deliver to their patients. 
Implications: information will not be enough. As our Dartmouth col-
league Paul Batalden is fond of saying, “Every system is perfectly designed to get 
the results it gets.” Because the payment system continues to reward the expansion 
of acute care facilities, there is little incentive for providers to pay attention to the 
volume of care they provide or to develop systems for managing and coordinating 
the care of patients with chronic illness. And hospitals are accountable—either to 
their stockholders or to those who hold their bonds—for their financial performance, 
which under the current payment system depends upon revenue derived from uti-
lization. Addressing the problem of excess acute care capacity will thus require 
reform of the payment system.
Over the last 50 years, the nation has invested heavily in such medical resources 
as specialists, acute care hospitals, intensive care beds, and expensive imaging 
equipment, much of which is allocated to the management of patients with chronic 
illnesses. Underlying this investment is the assumption that more intensive man-
agement of the chronically ill results in better health outcomes and greater patient 
satisfaction.
That assumption is being challenged by emerging clinical strategies designed to 
improve care: the hospice and palliative care movements, the growing chronic 
disease management industry, and population-based chronic care models that 
emphasize continuous and coordinated management of patients over time and 
among sectors of care. The assumption that more is better is also under scientific 
assault, as was discussed above (Table 1).
The single most important factor determining whether a community or a given care 
system and its associated physicians overtreats the chronically ill is the size of its 
acute care sector relative to the number of chronically ill patients who need treat-
ment. In high-cost regions and health systems, providers have overbuilt their acute 
care sectors; lower cost systems and regions have been more frugal, using fewer 
hospital beds, less physician labor, and less of such expensive technologies as 
intensive care beds and medical imaging devices. Organized systems of care—
group practices such as the Mayo Clinic and integrated hospital systems such as 
Intermountain Healthcare—typically use the fewest resources.
Dealing with 
Unwarranted Variation: 
Strategies for Reform 
(Chapter Five)
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Most Americans and policy makers agree the U.S. health care system is broken, but 
most proposals for reforming it have focused almost exclusively on extending cov-
erage to the uninsured. Attaining this goal, important as it is, will leave untouched 
the underlying major structural problems behind the unwarranted variation we have 
documented. These problems include (1) inadequate science; (2) poor coordination 
of care and overuse of acute care hospitals; and (3) a flawed payment system that 
rewards overuse. The current edition of the Atlas and several recent articles outline 
key elements of strategies to address these problems.4,14,15
Improving the scientific basis of care delivery. The remarkable vari-
ation in the way academic medical centers manage chronic illness is testimony 
to the weakness in the scientific basis of medicine. The neglect of the evaluative 
 sciences—those sciences whose mission is to evaluate medical theory, understand 
patient preferences, and establish the cost-effectiveness of clinical practice—has 
left the nation unprepared to deal with unwarranted variation. The consequences 
for public policy should be obvious.
The nation needs a crash program to transform the management of chronic illness 
to a rational system where what happens to patients is based primarily on illness 
severity, medical evidence, and the patient’s wishes, and where resource allocation 
and Medicare spending can be guided more and more by knowledge of what is 
needed to produce cost-effective, high-quality care. The support of such research 
needs to be the responsibility primarily of federal science policy. It makes no sense 
for the government to invest in biomedical research (such as most of the research 
funded by the National Institutes of Health) without complementary research aimed 
at determining how new and existing treatments affect the outcomes of care, the 
lives of patients, and the efficiency of clinical practice. And the research needs 
to be conducted in real time at the institutions where patients are receiving care. 
Because of the importance of following patients over time and across settings, it 
should be conducted by established group practices and integrated provider sys-
tems that are capable of organizing care over the span of an individual patient’s 
severe chronic illness. Participating organizations should be fairly compensated 
for conducting the research and should be further rewarded through a proposed 
shared savings program with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
designed to encourage the coordination of care and reduction of overuse.
Promoting the growth of organized, accountable care. Achieving better 
care coordination and reducing overuse of acute care hospital services will require 
new clinical policies and new ways of thinking about how to organize and finance 
care. As is evident from the data presented above and elsewhere, Medicare ben-
eficiaries with chronic illness are highly loyal to the hospitals and physicians who 
are already providing their care. In other words, most care for patients with chronic 
illness is already provided by defined groups of physicians associated with specific 
hospitals. Physician groups and hospitals should be encouraged to become real or 
virtual integrated systems that are willing to be accountable for the coordination, 
overall costs, and quality of care provided to their chronic disease patients. Steps 
could include requiring the adoption of either a single shared electronic health 
record or communication standards that ensure complete and reliable sharing of 
information among physicians and institutional providers within the defined network; 
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the implementation of care management systems such as disease registries and 
disease management protocols; and public reporting of performance measures on 
care coordination, informed patient choice, and costs.
The primary care “medical home” could provide a model for such coordination of 
care, especially if implemented as an element of a virtual or real organized delivery 
system where the other component parts (hospitals, specialists) had incentives to 
collaborate. The major limitation of the medical home models currently promoted 
by primary care specialties is their narrow focus: without collaboration from special-
ists to ensure both communication and collaborative decision making, and without 
financial incentives that encourage both hospitals and specialists to reduce over-
use, primary care coordination is likely to fail.
Shared savings: an incentive for all sectors to improve coordination 
and reduce overuse. Few providers will willingly see their incomes fall. Prospec-
tive payment systems that reward providers for cost-effective care may yet emerge, 
but even with substantial investments, fundamental reform of the payment system 
could take ten or more years. In the meantime, shared savings approaches could 
provide the third leg of a successful approach to reform of chronic disease care.ii 
Under a shared savings approach, providers who are willing to be accountable 
for chronic disease care and meet the key standards discussed above would be 
eligible for shared savings payments. Payments could be based on per beneficiary 
costs relative to appropriate spending targets. The targets could be based on the 
relative efficiency standards discussed above, and could be adjusted to ensure that 
even lower cost systems would also have an opportunity to receive payments. The 
key notion would be to provide a sufficient financial incentive for low-cost systems 
to avoid future growth and higher cost systems to be rewarded for reducing overuse 
of acute care settings and specialty services. The shared savings payments should 
allow both physicians and hospitals to preserve their margins (net income) while 
reducing their total revenues. Such an approach would offer the win-win incentives 
required to reduce unnecessary care and the overuse of acute care hospitals.
ii
 CMS has been conducting a demonstration project (the Physician Group Practice—PGP demo) in 
which large multi-specialty physician group practices that meet specific quality benchmarks are eligible 
for shared savings if they also reduce their spending growth below a specified target. Initial results of this 
program are promising, underscoring the potential benefit of a shared savings approach.
Trisolini M, Aggarwal J, Leung M, et al. The Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration: Les-
sons Learned on Improving Quality and Efficiency in Health Care. The Commonwealth Fund. February 
2008.
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Conclusion: Is Change 
Really Possible?
Information on the care provided to chronically ill Medicare beneficiaries at most U.S. 
acute care hospitals is available on the Dartmouth Atlas website, www.dartmouthatlas.
org. The information may be useful to a variety of stakeholders, from policy makers to 
patients and their families (see table, page 18).
To help users access the reports, we have developed a 
“drill-down” strategy that uses an index to locate states, 
regions, and hospitals according to their propensity to 
rely on the acute care hospital in managing chronic ill-
ness. The “hospital care intensity index,” or HCI, reflects 
the amount of time spent in the hospital and the intensity 
of physician services delivered in the hospital. Users can 
navigate through the states and regions to find hospitals 
and generate reports. The tables present performance 
measures grouped into distinct categories: Medicare 
Spending, Resource Allocation, and Patient Experience. 
How these reports might be used by various stakeholders 
is discussed in the Afterword.
Over 30 years ago Wennberg and Gittelsohn published their article describing 
variations in spending, resource allocation, and utilization within Vermont. One 
could look at the current data in the Dartmouth Atlas as evidence of how little has 
changed: marked variations in practice and spending remain across U.S. states, 
regions, and hospitals.
But we may be nearing a tipping point. Rapidly rising health care costs and their pro-
found impact on the future financial health of the U.S. government have brought the 
variations phenomenon—and the potential for savings that it implies—to the atten-
tion of leading government officials.2 Concern about the possible collapse of primary 
care and the growing recognition of the adverse impact of fragmented chronic dis-
ease care has motivated increasing interest in payment reform to support improved 
care coordination by fostering the development of effective “medical homes” for 
patients with chronic illness and others.16 And policy makers—from the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS)—are supporting policy development and demonstration programs 
that include a focus on fostering accountable care organizations and shared savings 
models. Any major reform, however, will depend upon Congressional action.
Ultimately, it may be the baby boomers themselves who will tip the balance and play 
a decisive role in influencing public policy. Today, increasing numbers are involved 
in their parents’ struggles with the final years of life, the time when severe chronic 
illness intrudes on the lives of most Americans. From this experience, some baby 
boomers will learn of the perils of overtreatment. But translating personal experi-
ence into effective public policy will require a debate over the quality of care, and 
the quality of death, that results from the widely varying practices of health care 
providers. It is our hope that the Dartmouth Atlas will stimulate a wider public dis-
course on these matters.
Stakeholders How they might use Atlas data
Policy makers & government officials understand importance of variations to national 
and local health care reform initiatives
Payers & employers compare provider efficiency as foundation for 
negotiation of alternative payment approaches
hospital boards & administrators use information to guide construction, recruitment 
and care management planning.
Journalists & bloggers Prepare local or national stories discussing practice 
variation—and “name names.”
Patients & families identify and choose caregivers with practice 
patterns that fit their preferences.
Physicians & care managers help patients receive care they want by using 
data to stimulate discussion and advanced care 
planning.
Accessing Information 
on the Dartmouth Atlas 
Website (Afterword)
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